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The Yenisei Cossacks, one of the oldest 
military formations in Siberia, took the most 
active part in the Civil War in the east of Russia. 
The first Cossacks appeared at the Yenisei 
River at the beginning of  the 17th century. At 
the beginning of the 20th century, although they 
had lived in the area for centuries, the Yenisei 
Cossacks were relatively few in number. In 1917 
there were only about 14,000 Yenisei Cossacks 
of both genders [3, p. 49]. Also, the Yenisei 
Cossacks’ status was not high. After the Yenisei 
Cossacks’ regiment was abolished in 1871 and up 
to the beginning of the 20th century, there was 
only the Yenisei Cossacks’ hundred, which was 
transformed into the Yenisei Cossacks’ division 
of three hundred during the war time. In 1910 
regulation for the Krasnoyarsk Cossacks’ division 
was approved [9, p. 329]. During the First World 
War the Yenisei Cossacks’ regiment was formed 
[17 p. 662]. After the revolution, in February 
1917, the Yenisei Cossacks made an attempt to 
raise their status.  On 25 May (3 June) 1917 the 
First Yenisei Cossacks’ convention established 
the Yenisei Cossacks’ battalion [14, pp. 21 - 22]. 
The union council of Cossacks’ troops admitted 
the Yenisei Cossacks’ battalion as a full member, 
and a delegate from the Yenisei Cossacks entered 
its body [6, p 97]. But, the official Russian 
government did not accept the convention decree. 
Only in 1919 did the government of А. Colchak 
raise the Yenisei Cossacks into the rank of a 
battalion on a common basis with all the Cossacks 
troops [17, p. 662]. 
Though  relatively few and having no battalion 
status, the Yenisei Cossacks, nevertheless, took an 
active part in the Civil War. One hundred of the 
Yenisei Cossacks, under the Captain Korshunov’s 
command, made up the convoy of P. Krasnov 
during his troops’ attack at Petrograd in October 
1917 [17, p. 43]. In 1918 the Yenisei Cossacks, 
assigned to army 1 of the eastern front line under 
the command of General А. Pepeliaev, took 
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part in the occupation of the city Perm, the most 
important industrial centre of the Northern Urals 
[4, p. 688]. In 1918 – 1919 the main forces of 
the Yenisei Cossacks were cast into the struggle 
with the Red partisans, acting in the south of the 
Yeniseisk guberniya and in the Uriankhayskiy 
region (Tuva). After Admiral Kolchak’s army 
defeat in the end of 1919, the Yenisei Cossacks, 
having drawn off with the main White forces to 
Transbaikalia, were actively fighting the Red 
Army in the Far East in 1920 – 1922. They were 
one of the last White guardsmen to leave Russia 
[18, p. 477 - 548].
One of the greatest and most important 
episodes of the Civil War for the Yenisei Cossacks 
was the actions of the bands of R. Ungern-
Sternberg and А. Bakich  in Mongolia. These 
events, by their essence, were one of the last real 
attempts by the Yenisei Cossacks to continue an 
organized anti-soviet struggle and to change the 
situation in Siberia to their advantage. 
Researching the combat activity of the 
Yenisei Cossacks, who were part of the white 
bands in Mongolia, gives an opportunity not 
only to restore an important episode of Civil War 
history, but also to clarify the role of the Yenisei 
Cossacks in these events, which had over and 
above a very serious foreign-policy significence. 
Moreover, researching the Yenisei Cossacks’ role 
in these events allows a better understanding of 
the reasons for the emergence of the bands of R. 
Ungern-Sternberg and А. Bakich and shows the 
backgrounds that defined the character of Russian 
military forces’ actions in Mongolia during the 
Civil War period. 
In order to achieve all this, it is first necessary 
to analyze the reasons for the Yenisei Cossacks’ 
mass departure from Siberia to Mongolia; to study 
the circumstances of the Cossacks’ unit entering 
the military forces, under the command of R. 
Ungern-Sternberg and А. Bakich; to examine 
the Yenisei Cossacks’ actions during the military 
confrontation of the Whites and the Reds in 
Mongolia and nearby territories; to define the 
reasons of their actions. 
The article covers the period from the end 
of 1920 – the time, when a unit of the Yenisei 
Cossacks was formed under the command of I. 
Kazantsev in Mongolia, up to the end of 1921, 
when General Bakich’s unit, containing the 
last white Yenisei Cossacks in the region, was 
defeated. 
This article coveres events in Mongolia and 
the Uriankhayskiy region. At the time of the Civil 
War, Mongolia was «de jure» a part of China. In 
spite of this, the Chinese government could not 
always control the situation there. Having its own 
autonomy and, at the same time, being a part 
of China, Mongolia was influenced by Russia. 
From the end of 19th century Russia had disputed 
China’s right to Uriankhay, while at the beginning 
of the century Russia had established almost full 
control of the region. Moreover, the Mongolian 
government tried to claim the Uriankhayskiy 
region. The unclear legal status of Mongolia and 
Uriankhay, the difficult domestic policy situation 
between China and Russia, and the contradictory 
interests of the local regional elite had determined 
the complicated situation in which the Yenisei 
Cossacks found out themselves abroad.
The Yenisei Cossacks’ activity within the 
White military forces in Mongolia has received 
little attention. Currently there are no scholarly 
works devoted to this theme.
The article by N. Yefseev «The Defeat of 
General Bakich» was published in 1923 and it is 
one of the first works by Soviet historians about 
Russian White military forces in Mongolia. The 
author of the article describes the liquidation of 
Bakich’s unit, to which the Yenisei Cossacks 
belonged, in the proper ideological tone [8]. 
Later, in Soviet historiography, the 
participation of the Yenisei Cossacks in the Civil 
War on Mongolian territory was considered more 
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often in the context of battle actions in separate 
regions of RSFSR. Here, we should mention 
some of the most interesting research - the works 
by K. Seifulin  «The History of Foreign Military 
Intervention  and the Civil War in Tuva», by V. 
Ochur «The Great October and Tuva» and others. 
[13, 15].
In modern Russian historiography the 
Yenisei Cossacks’ participation in the White 
military forces in Mongolia has not yet become 
a subject of special research. Nevertheless, many 
authors have touched on the theme. For example, 
the Yenisei Cossacks participation in operations 
in the Far East are discussed in detail  in the 
book by V. Shuldyakov «The Yenisei Cossacks’ 
Battalion Destruction» [17, 18]. Great attention 
is given to the Yenisei Cossacks’ participation 
in the Civil War in the southern territory of the 
Yeniseisk guberniya, the Uriankhayskiy region 
and Mongolia in the work by V. Datsishen «Sayan 
knot» and others [7]. Moreover, it is also necessary 
to mention such academic-belletristic works as 
«The Sovereign of the Desert» by L. Yuzefovich 
[19] and «The Black Griffon’s Feather» by К. 
Shoygu [16], whose authors used a wide range of 
material about the history of Central Siberia and 
Mongolia in the Civil War period, including data 
about the Yenisei Cossacks.
Currently there are no works written by 
foreign historians about the Yenisei Cossacks in 
the White units in Mongolia during the Civil War 
period. The reminiscences of  former officers of 
the Asian horse cavalry division published by V. 
Shayditskiy, A. Makeev and some others in 1930 
– 1960 are simple memoirs without any historical 
analysis [2].
After the destruction of the Siberian Army 
under the command of А. Kolchak, the main part 
of the Yenisei Cossacks, the Yenisei Cossacks’ 
brigade, which consisted of the Yenisei Cossacks’ 
regiments 1 and 2, the Yenisei Cossacks artillery 
battery and the alternative hundred, left together 
with the White military forces, drawing off to 
Transbaikalia [17, p. 664]. Though, drawing off 
the Yeniseisk guberniya and the Uriankhayskiy 
region, a significant number of the Yenisei 
Cossacks concentrated in Western Mongolia from 
1920 – to the beginning of 1921. They camped in 
Ulyasutay Town, not far from the Tuva border. 
Several reasons made the Yenisei Cossacks leave 
for Mongolia. 
Firstly, the Yenisei Cossacks believed that 
the Reds would be soon be forced out of Siberia, 
as they had been in 1918. Hoping for such an 
end, the Cossacks did not want to go far from 
their homes. In Mongolia, they could get current 
information about their native places, making it 
possible to take part in the Reds’ expulsion at a 
well-chosen moment and promptly return to their 
homes. Uriankhay and Mongolia, after it had 
been occupied by the Reds, closely fit this target. 
Situated  near the Yenisei Cossacks’ homes and 
having well-run lines of communication with the 
Yeniseisk guberniya, these regions were well-
known to the Cossacks. From the beginning of 17th 
century the Yenisei Cossacks had traditionally 
served on the border of Mongolia and China. 
From the end of 19th century they had visited 
the Uriankhayskiy region during their service [7, 
p. 62, 116]. Moreover, economic contacts with 
the population of the Uriankhayskiy region and 
Mongolia had also been developing. Apparently, 
this familiarit with Uriankhay and Mongolia 
contributed to the Yenisei Cossacks’ retreating 
to these territories after the defeat of Kolchak’s 
army in Siberia. We may also suppose that the 
Yenisei Cossacks did not forget the promise of А. 
Kolchak to give them the Uriankhayskiy region as 
their battalion territory [17, p 336].
Secondly, the Yenisei Cossacks, in retreating 
to Mongolia, could have simply failed to be on 
time to leave for Transbaikalia with the main 
military forces of the Siberian army. And to stay in 
the Yeniseisk guberniya territory was dangerous. 
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This was due not only to the approach of the Red 
Army, but also to the extremely hostile attitude 
towards the Yenisei Cossacks from the regional 
peasant population [13, p. 19]. Even before the 
beginning of the Civil War, the representatives 
of the first Yenisei Cossacks’ convention in May, 
1917, had stated that both the peasants and the 
foreign population  of the Yeniseisk guberniya 
had a hostile attitude towards the Cossacks [14, p. 
7, 11]. During the Civil War period, the main part 
of the Yenisei Cossacks - 10 hundreds out of 12, 
was in the Yeniseisk guberniya and was engaged 
in suppressing peasants’ rebellions, which only 
exacerbated the Cossacks’ relations with local 
peasants. Moreover, the Yenisei Cossacks did 
not live in a compact group, but were spread 
throughout the Yeniseisk guberniya, which was a 
great disadvantage during conflicts with peasants 
and foreigners. One should also consider the 
small size of the Cossacks’ population compared 
to the total guberniya population, - about 0, 8% [6, 
p. 94, 96]. The fact that there were many women 
and children, apparently members of Cossacks’ 
families, within Bakich’s unit, also implicitly 
reveals the hostility of the native non-Cossack 
population as of a reason for the Cossacks’ mass 
departure.
Having left for Mongolia, the Yenisei 
Cossacks formed a unit, the leader of which 
became the Yenisei Cossacks’ battalion captain 
I. Kazantsev. According to some sources, 
Ensign Zanin’s hundred became the backbone of 
Kazantsev’s unit. [17, p. 664]. At the end of 1920 
– beginning of 1921, under the command of I. 
Kazantsev up to 150 Yenisei Cossacks gathered. 
I. Kazantsev was elected president of the battalion 
administration by circle 5 of the Yenisei Cossacks’ 
battalion, which took place in the period of 15 – 
21 of February, 1919 in Minusink. In May, 1920 
Bolsheviks put him into the  Irkutskaya guberniya 
prison, from which he ran away from in October 
of that year [3, p. 49; 8, p. 244]. Possessing 
high official status and great physical force and 
resoluteness, I. Kazantsev could successfully take 
upon himself the role of unit commandment [17, 
p. 162].
Far from home, in alien surroundings, the 
Yenisei Cossacks were ready and willing to 
continue their struggle. 
The situation in Mongolia at that time was 
complicated. Having received a wide autonomy 
within the frames of the Chinese state in 1911, 
Mongolia was under a zone influence of Russia. 
It allowed the Mongolian government to carry out 
an independent policy. However, in 1919 China 
took advantage of the internal war in Russia 
and occupied Mongolia. The head of Mongolia, 
Bogdo-gegen, was actually under house arrest. 
A year later the situation changed. After the 
defeat of the Far-Eastern (White) Army of Ataman 
G. Semenov by the military forces of People’s-
Revolutionary Army of the Far-Eastern Republic 
in Transbaikalia in October 1920, Baron R. 
Ungern-Sternberg left Russia. He understood that 
he could not stand against the Reds by himself, 
and he went to Mongolia with his Asian horse 
cavalry division [9, p. 237, 240]. On 3 February 
1921 R. Ungern-Sternberg expelled the Chinese 
from Urga Town. He became the governor of 
Mongolia and made it a base for his military 
operations against Soviet Russia. The Mongolian 
elite, the lords and Bogdo-gegen, were grateful to 
R. Ungern-Sternberg for freeing them from the 
Chinese and, afraid of their return, supported all 
his undertakings. 
Under such circumstances, Baron R. Ungern-
Sternberg, the Russian officer, the constant enemy 
of the Soviet system, the person who had taken 
under his control the main part of Mongolia, 
could be considered by the Yenisei Cossacks as 
their absolute leader. Already in spring 1921, 
when Baron Ungern began to take the control 
of all the Russian military forces in Mongolia 
at that time, the detachment of I. Kazantsev 
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became part of the Asian horse cavalry division, 
while also remaining as a separate military unit 
[18, p. 336]. Apparently, the Baron’s promise to 
fulfill Kolchak’s decision had played a role in I. 
Kazantsev’s decision to submit to R. Ungern-
Sternberg, the decision to create the Uriankhay 
Cossacks’ battalion from the Yenisei Cossacks, 
and the assignation of the Uriankhayskiy region to 
the Cossacks for colonization. According to some 
accounts, the Yenisei Cossacks of I. Kazantsev’s 
unit took the promise at face value and even began 
to calculate the size of their future land shares [17, 
p. 336]. Moreover, Ungern appointed I. Kazantsev 
himself to be a battalion ataman, notwithstanding 
the fact that officially the Yenisei Cossacks 
already had an ataman – A. Tyalshinskiy, elected 
in Big Circle 5 of the Yenisei Cossacks’ battalion 
[3, p. 49]. We may also suppose that, at that time, 
the victory of the Reds in Siberia was not taken 
by the Yenisei Cossacks as final, and that they 
hoped for events similar to those of 1918, when 
for several weeks almost all of Siberia was free 
of Bolsheviks. They understood the necessity of 
continued fighting against the Reds, and with the 
support of other Whites. 
Atthe end of April, Ungern met with the 
heads of separate units under the Baron’s operative 
command in Van-Khure Village. B. Rezukhin, N. 
Kazagrandy, А. Shubin, I. Kazantsev and others 
were present. At the meeting the plan of future 
combat operations against Soviet Russia was 
discussed. Actually, two plans suggested by B. 
Rezukhin and N. Kazagrandy, commanders of the 
biggest battle units, were discussed. B. Rezukhin 
suggested a plan in which all the small units led 
by B. Rezukhin, N. Kazagrandy, A. Shubin, I. 
Kazantsev were to join his brigade, which would 
have contained up to 700 men. Being the third 
brigade head of the Asian division, B. Rezukhin 
was going to cross at the western side of the 
Selenga River and move to Baikal. At the same 
time, Ungern himself was to attack Troitskosavsk 
and Kyakhta along the Orkhon valley and, after 
their capture, he was to attack Verkhneudinsk. 
N. Kazagrandy offered another plan. 
According to it, all the smaller units, B. Rezukhin’s 
brigade and Ungern’s main military forces would 
have acted by themselves but according to a  single 
plan and would have coordinated their actions 
with each other. Kaygorodov had to fight from 
Kobdo to Biysk, Kazagrandy and Shubin had to go 
to the southern part of the Irkutskaya guberniya, 
and Kazantsev had to go through Uriankhay, in 
order to organize the Yenisei Cossacks for the 
struggle against the Soviet regime. Apparently, 
the later plan counted on a mass volunteers’ 
inrush into the White units from local territories, 
through which it had been planned to attack. 
In the other case, spreading forces would have 
deprived the attacking side of all hope of success. 
There were real chances of support from the local 
population. In the beginning of 1921, Y. Yanson, 
the Central Siberia foreign affairs commissar 
reported to B. Shumyatskiy: «The moods in 
Mongolia and Uriankhay are not to our advantage 
[…]. The presence of our military forces in the 
Uriankhayskiy region is not justified for the 
White liquidation.» [1, Fond 1, Bordereau 1, File 
125. List 7]. After some hesitations, R. Ungern-
Sternberg accepted the plan of N. Kazagrandy. 
The result of it was the appearance of «Order 15» 
[18, p. 172].
The official issuing date of «Order 15» was 
21 May, 1921. By this Order, Ungern proclaimed 
the beginning of a crusade against Soviet Russia, 
aiming to overthrow Bolshevism and, in paragraph 
4, in particular, defined the direction of the main 
blows: «… а) Western – the Manzhouli station; 
b) the Mondensk direction, along Yablonoi 
Mountains; c) along the Selenga river; d) the 
Irkutsk direction; e) out from the Uriankhayskiy 
region down the Yenisei river; е) down the Irtish 
river. […] The commanders of separate sectors 
had to be ruled by these directions and to follow 
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the directives of colonel N. Kazagrandy in Irkutsk 
direction, orders of Yenisei Cossacks’ battalion 
ataman I. Kazantsev in the Uriankhay direction, 
and orders of Cossack captain Kaygorodov in the 
Irtish direction » [19, p. 231].  
In May 1921, preparing his unit attack, I. 
Kazantsev arrived in Uriankhay, at Khemchik, 
allegedly being invited by Khemchik noyon 
Buyan-Budyirgy. At the meeting with the heads 
of two Khemchik khoshuns, I. Kazantsev  reached 
an agreement with the Touvinians that they would 
find 400 armed soldiers Touvinians for Kazantsev’s 
unit. But, the day after the negotiations begun, I. 
Kazantsev had to run away, having left behind 
all the documents and his personal effects. The 
revolting arats rounded upon him right on the 
place of negotiations with the noyons [7, p. 202]. 
But nevertheless,  the prearrangements for the 
military advance were continued. The Mongolian 
military department sent to Touvinian governors 
the orders, where Uriankhay noyons were obliged 
to render  every kind of assistance to Kazantsev’s 
unit. Moreover, according to this order, it was 
decided to send an officer, lama Chamzy-Kamby, 
to the Uriankhayskiy region, to Khemchik «in 
order to gather arms and soldiers in Uriankhay 
khoshuns and sumo for joining Russian White 
military forces and concurrently mopping up our 
lands of the enemy» [15, p. 97].
On 18 May, 1921 Kazantsev’s unit entered 
the Uriankhayskiy region in two columns. Having 
entered the Uriankhay territory, the eastern column, 
under the command of Lieutenant Popolzukhin, 
camped at the estuary of the Tarlashkyn River. 
The second column, under the leadership of I. 
Kazantsev himself, headed for Khemchik. Shortly 
before that, Kazantsev had received a letter 
from noyon Daa-khoshun Buyan-Budyirgy, in 
which he promised to give Kazantsev 400 well-
armed Touvinians. Being completely sure of the 
Touvinian elite’s support, Kazantsev sent a secret 
letter to Popolzukhin, when he was still half way 
to Khemchik. In the letter he wrote: «Instructions: 
take under your command the mobilized Uriankhay 
population, and form out of them two hundreds for 
Soyot regiment 2. In order to drill them military, 
appoint to them your cavalry instructors, knowing 
the language, if possible». By the same letter I. 
Kazantsev suggested measures for capturing I. 
Safyanov, the most active adherent of the Soviet 
Regime in Tuva [16, p. 59]. 
However, the well-planned operation of the 
Yenisei Cossacks’s unit suffered a defeat. On 
23 May 1921 Popolzukhin’s unit was already 
smashed by the Red partisan unit of S. Kochetov 
at the Tarlashkyn River. The main part of the 
unit was destroyed and most Cossacks, including 
unit commander Popolzukhin, were captured by 
the Reds. Simultaneously, two Red squadrons of 
regiment 352, under the leadership of regiment 
commandant Lizenkov, occupied Samagaltay 
khure, where there was the White camp. [1. F. Р-
49. B.ac. 2 Fl. 10. L. 112]. At the same day, on 23rd 
May, at Khemchik, in the Chadan region of, 200 
of the armed Touvinians attacked the Kazantsev's 
camp. Having lost many soldiers, the White unit 
had to leave for Mongolia [7, p. 203]. Having 
examined captured Lieutenant Popolzukhin, the 
Reds found out, that «…at the beginning of the 
operation in the region of Khemchik -Samagaltay 
there was one common enemy unit of 450 men 
under the command of ataman I. Kazantsev, 
reporting to Ungern. The unit was divided into 
three groups and performed Soyots’ impressment, 
which gave them in result up to 700 men. The 
first group under the command of  Lieutenant 
Kryakhno was placed along the Chadan river 
(apparently, I. Kazantsev, the commander of the 
unit, was within the group – М. Т.), the second 
and the third groups made camp in the region of 
Yercin-Gol, besides, the second group had been 
destroyed in battle (the group of Popolzukhin 
himself is meant – М. Т.), and the third group, 
under the command of warrant officer Vedernikov, 
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was gone in an unknown direction» [5, p. 269]. 
While estimating  the White military forces in 
Mongolia, the Reds somewhat exaggerated their 
quantity, in particular, Kazantsev’s unit, which 
they thought about 700 cavalry men [11, p. 244]. 
The following reasons led to Kazantsev’s 
unit defeat in Uriankhay. Firstly, the Uriankhay 
population’s impressment failed to give not only 
battle-worthy personnel assets but, on the contrary, 
it weakened the unit in that the impressed Soyots 
tried to desert as quickly as possible, they also felt 
hostility towards their commandment. Secondly, 
while being on Ungern’s side, Mongolian lords 
wanted to gain control over Tuva, which had 
been always considered be a part of Mongolia. 
They managed to get their plans approval by 
the Uriankhay elite, but not by the Uriankhay 
population, whose attitude towards Mongolians 
was extremely antagonistic. This can explain the 
fact that ordinary Touvinians-arats took the most 
active part in the struggle against Kazantsev’s units. 
Thirdly, Kazantsev’s unit had  a critically limited 
supply of arms. Here, for example, is  information 
from the Minusinsk district executive committee 
to the Yeniseisk regional committee about one of 
Kazantsev’s units: «…the second band […] is of 
three hundred men, only one hundred being armed 
among them, and among the other two hundreds 
there are several women-refugees» [1. F. 1. B. 1. 
Fl. 133. L. 121]. Apparently, this unit was actually 
a group of refugees not capable of fighting 
seriously. The Mongolian governors’ reaction 
to Kazantsev’s unit defeat was interesting. The 
Mongolian khan Tsorukhtu sent a letter to ambyn-
noyon Sodnam-Balchir with a request to provide 
him the information about «what kind of Russians 
have destroyed the White unit of Mongolians and 
Russians, their quantity, where they are now, and 
who from khoshuns and how many  Uriankhay 
men have been involved in that incident». More 
over, the letter instructed that these Uriankhay 
men were to be «judged strictly» by Mongolian 
lords [13, p. 98]. In the letter to the Khemchik 
Noyons, the khan threatened to punish those 
Noyons, «who have not full filled their promises, 
and over disobedient arats as well» [16, p. 101]. 
Active diplomatic pressure by the Mongolian 
government on Uriankhay Noyons continued up 
to the middle of the summer of 1921 – when the 
pro-Soviet government of Sukhe-Bator came to 
power in Mongolia. This event not only deprived 
the White units of the Mongolian government’s 
support, but it meant the failure of all their plans 
of armed struggle against the Soviet Regime. The 
Red government victory in Mongolia made their 
chances for physical survival insignificant. 
Striving for the final defeat of the White 
military forces in Mongolia, the Red partisans held 
a conference on 3 August, 1921. In the conference 
it was decided to unite all the partisan units of 
Uriankhay under the command of S. Kochetov. 
Moreover, in August, 1921, regiment 440 of the 
Red Army was deployed from Minusinsk to Tuva 
[7, p. 205]. At the end of August –  the beginning 
of September the Soviet commandment began 
a military attack on the White positions in all 
directions.  Red troops were brought into Mongolia 
from Altai and Uriankhay. On 6 September, 1921, 
cavalry division 13, consisting of 1350 soldiers, 32 
machine-guns and 4 main guns, occupied Shara-
Sume Town. Selected special designation unit 22 
of soviet army 5 under the command of К. Baikalov 
(Nekunde) left Kosh-Agach for Kobdo. The main 
body of the unit was Irkutsk communists and 
Komsomols; it numbered 450 Red soldiers, 300 
of them were cavalry men with 20 machine-guns. 
An integrated partisan unit, consisting of 425 men 
under the command of S. Kochetov, went from the 
Uriankhayskiy region to Ulangom [10, p. 18 - 20].
Nevertheless, the Russian and foreign 
soldiers’ unit of esaul А. Kaygorodov managed to 
block the unit of K. Baikalov in Sarul-Gun khure 
in the region of the Tolbo-nur Lake, not far from 
Kobdo. The unit of General А. Bakich, consisting 
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of the remnants of the Orenburgian corps and also 
including a large number of refugees, women, 
children and civilians, arrived at Sarul-Gun to join 
Kaygorodov [15, p. 316]. I. Kazantsev and his 
unit, consisting of, according to different sources 
of information, from 150 to 300 men, alsoarrived 
there, after having failed to attack Uriankhay [11, 
p. 253; 15, p. 336]. Some researchers think that, 
at   the beginning of August 1921, after having 
failed to attack the territory of Soviet Russia and 
having lost Urga, Baron Ungern himself planned 
to retreat to Western Mongolia and unite with the 
military forces of А. Bakich, А. Kaygorodov and 
I. Kazantsev, but the mutiny, which had just begun 
in the Asian division, disrupted his plans [11, p. 
252].
An integrated unit of А. Kaygorodov, А. 
Bakich and I. Kazantsev managed to defeat the 
Red Mongolian unit of Khasbator, which consisted 
of 400 sabers, and was close to taking control of 
all of Western Mongolia. But the siege of Sarul-
Gun monkery ended in failure. The fighting spirit 
of the besieged, their superior armament did not 
allow the Whites to capture the monkery. The 
Reds declined the ultimatum of А. Bakich, who 
had become the head of the integrated unit, and 
fought off several combat assaults of the khure 
[11, p. 253]. 
The Soviet Government urgently sent  an 
integrated unit of Chonovians and two regular 
regiments to help – regiment 185 of Perm rifle 
division 21 and cavalry regiment 59 [1. F. Р-49. 
B. 2 ac. Fl. 10. L. 7]. Having known about the 
approach of major Red military forces,  the Whites 
relieved the khure siege that had lasted for 42 days. 
After that, the unit of Kaygorodov left А. Bakich 
and managed to reach the Altai Mountains. At 
that time,  a mutiny occured in I. Kazantsev’s unit, 
caused by its continuous failures. The major part 
of the unit left their commander and moved to the 
Reds. The fate of these soldiers is unknown. After 
that, the remnant Kazantsev’s Cossacks decisively 
joined the unit of А. Bakich [11, p. 253].  
On 25 October 1921, in the region of 
Khonur-Ulen, 100 kilometers north-west from 
Kobdo, Bakich’s unit was defeated by the Red 
troops of rifle regiment 185 and cavalry regiment 
59 and was staved to Kobdo, from there it left for 
Ulangom [1. F. Р-49. B. 2 ac. Fl. 10. L. 7]. As this 
took place, some Bakich’s people left the unit and 
surrendered to the Reds. Most of these captives, 
Yenisei Cossacks among them, died of cold or 
hunger or were simply shot by the guards [18, p. 
337]. 
In despair, А. Bakich and I. Kazantsev tried 
to find a way into the Uriankhayskiy region. 
There were no paths of retreat to China; Mongolia 
was fully under the Reds’ control. More over, А. 
Bakich could not count for internment, as far as 
in May – June, 1921, after the defeat of the White 
Army, the unit under his command retreated to 
China from  Russia and, having refused to disarm, 
smashed Chinese troops  and went to Altai 
district of Sintszyan. It is thought that А. Bakich 
intended to free the district of Chinese troops, to 
join the region to Outer Mongolia and make it a 
base for military operations against Soviet Russia 
[17, p. 327 - 321]. Moreover, the presence of 
Ungern, who had fought against the governmental 
Chinese troops in the unit meant that the Chinese 
government would not necessarily act humanely 
towards Russian soldiers and officers.
The impossibility of staying in Mongolia, the 
unwillingness or incapability of  leaving  for China 
forced А. Bakich and I. Kazantsev to capture a 
major populated point in Uriankhay territory, to 
make a base in it and to try to survive a severe 
winter. 
Esaul А. Kaygorodov demonstrated a 
capability of battling through the territory of 
Soviet Russia and starting an armed struggle 
against the Reds. His unit, earlier coordinated by 
А. Bakich, after the defeat at Sarul-Gun, managed 
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to rush through on the territory of Russia, to the 
Altai Mountains, where А. Kaygorodov began 
active partisan operations [18, p. 339 - 340]. 
The unit’s target became a large Russian 
village Atamanovka, situated in Uriankhay, not 
far from Belotsarsk. On 21 December, 1921 
Bakich – Kazantsev’s unit, numbering more than 
1000 men of Orenburgian, Siberian and Yenisei 
Cossacks, White Guards and White patriots, 
attacked Atamanovka. Apparently, it became 
disastrous for the Whites that, while crossing a 
polynya in the Elegest River, they could not save 
the machine guns and main guns fromgetting 
wet and rendered them useless. Nevertheless, the 
Whites began to attack the village and the Red 
garrison barely managed to fight them. During the 
second attack, the Red partisan unit of S. Kochetov 
struck behind Bakich and Kazantsev. The Whites 
were completely defeated. Up to 200 men were 
slaughtered or wounded; up to 300 were captured 
by the Reds. Five machine guns, one main gun 
and the whole column of vehicles were seized by 
the Reds. In the battle the unit’s commander and 
the Yenisei Cossacks’ captain I. Kazantsev was 
killed [18, p. 338]. 
А. Bakich and the remnants of his unit had to 
go back to Mongolia, to Ulangom. But there was 
no longer any possibility to continue the struggle. 
On 30 December, 1921 А. Bakich capitulated 
with all his unit of 700 men to the Mongolian 
revolutionary government military forces under 
the command of Khatan-Bator-Van [11, p. 253]. 
This event put an end to the Yenisei Cossacks’ 
participation in organized opposition to the Soviet 
Regime in Mongolia. According to operations 
reports, sent to the headquarters of army 5, there 
was a significant number of women and children 
among the captives. There were 23 women and 
children out of 131 people of a captives’ gang that 
arrived in Minusinsk at the end of March, 1922. If 
we take into account the  apparently much higher 
mortality rate among these groups of captives, 
especially in winter time, we may suppose that in 
I. Kazantsev’s and А. Bakich’s units, women and 
children reached up to one fifth of the total number 
of people. So, here it may be more appropriate to 
speak about refugee groups, rather than about 
battle units [F. 1. B. 1. Fl. 108. L. 19]. 
In conclusion, giving a general evaluation 
of the Yenisei Cossacks’ actions as a part of the 
White military forces in Mongolia, it is necessary 
to underline the following principal moments.
The reasons for the  mass departure of the 
Yenisei Cossacks to Mongolia in the beginning of 
1920 – 1921 lay in the Yenisei Cossacks’ attempt 
to find safety for themselves and their families 
from the Soviet persecution. The relatively small 
number of Cossacks and their family members 
(about 0,8 %) of  the  population of the Yeniseisk 
guberniya, and also their dispersed settlements 
among peasants and foreigners hostile to them 
were also a reason for their departure abroad. 
The impossibility of the majority of the Yenisei 
Cossacks to leave for Transbaikalia, and also their 
attempt to be near the territory of their former 
settlements determined their major concentration 
in Mongolia. This fact is also proved by the content 
of the Yenisei Cossacks’ unit in Mongolia. There 
was a very high rate of refugees in the unit (up to 
two thirds): women, children and unarmed men. 
Apparently, the refugees also originally planned 
to return to their homes after the political situation 
changed. A good knowledge of the regions from 
military service and business, contributed to the 
Yenisei Cossacks’ departure to the Uriankhayskiy 
region and then to Mongolia. 
The Yenisei Cossacks’ battalion joined the 
unit under the command of I. Kazantsev, a part 
of the Asian horse cavalry division of R. Ungern-
Sternberg.  The latter joined  the unit of А. Bakich 
and was determined to become a part of any 
major anti-Bolshevic politico-military force  that 
gave them an opportunity not only to continue 
the struggle against the Reds, but also to save 
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the Yenisei Cossacks, their families and other 
refugees in Mongolia, from Soviet Russia’s peril 
and from danger from the Mongolians. 
The Yenise Cossacks battalion under the 
command of I. Kazantsev was involved in the 
armed opposition of the White units of R. Ungern-
Sternberg and А. Bakich against the Chinese 
government, and the continuing battles with 
Soviet troops. Having joined the White units in 
Mongolia, the Yenisei Cossacks took a most active 
part in the struggle against the Reds. This could 
be explained by the fact that, first of all, the zone 
of military actions was very close to the places 
of the Cossacks’ former settlements. The attack, 
undertaken by Baron Ungern in Soviet Russia, 
was a failure and it deprived the Cossacks of the 
possibility of returning to their homes.  The White 
units’ military confrontation against the Chinese 
government, while in Mongolia, made impossible 
to retreat to China. The victory of the pro-Soviet 
government of Sukhe-Bator made remaining 
in Mongolia extremely dangerous for both the 
Yenisei Cossacks and all the White units. 
Under such circumstances, the only way out 
for the Yenisei Cossacks was an attempt to fight 
in Russia, in order to start a new round of  military 
struggle against the Soviet Regime. The situation 
in Siberia and in Soviet Russia did not give them 
this opportunity. 
On the whole, the situation in which the 
Yenisei Cossacks found themselves in Mongolia 
in 1920 – 1921 and their actions during that period 
were caused by a whole row of circumstances 
of both objective and subjective character. 
The Cossacks met irresolvable problems and 
consequent circumstances were characteristic 
of that time and place for all the White military 
forces. 
References
1. Archive Agency of the Krasnoyarsk Region Administration (ААKRA). Funds: 1 (Yeniseisk 
Guberniya Committee of Russian Communist Party (Bolsheviks), Р-49 (Yeniseisk Guberniya 
Executive Committee of Working, Peasant and the Red Army Deputies’ Soviet).
2. The White Emigration in China and Mongolia, compiled by S.Volkov (Moscow: CJSC 
Tsentrpoligraph, 2005).
3. Y. Buyanov, The Yenisei Cossacks’ Battalion Society (The Yenisei Cossacks’ Battalion). Cossacks 
at the Yenisei River (Krasnoyarsk, 2003), p. 47-52.
4. The Great Siberian Ice March, compiled by S.Volkov (Moscow: CJSC Tsentrpoligraph, 2004).
5. Soviet Russia Policy in Far East (1920 – 1922). Collection of documents   (Novosibirsk, 1996).
6. V. Datsishen, ‘Krasnoyarsk Cossacks at the End of XIX – at the Beginning of XX Centuries. About 
the Problem of Identity Preservation and Social Class Circularity’, Siberian sub-ethnos: culture, 
traditions, mentality, N. 2, Book 1 (Krasnoyarsk, 2006), pp. 92-100.
7. V. Datsishen and G. Ondar, «Sayan knot»: the Usinsko-Uriankhayskiy region: Russian-Touvinian 
relations in 1911-1921 (Kyzyl, 2003).
8. N. Yevseev, ‘The Defeat of General Bakich’, The Red Army of Siberia, № 5/6 (Novonikolayevsk, 
1923), pp. 123-155.
9. Cossacks’ Battalions. Up to April, 1912: Reference Book of the Imperial headquarters, compiled 
by V.Khazin (St. Petersburg, 1912).
10. I. Molokov, The Defeat of Bakich (Omsk, 1979).
11. P. Novikov, The Civil War in Eastern Siberia (Moscow: CJSC Tsentrpoligraph, 2005).
– 114 –
Michael Tarasov. The Yenisei Cossacks in Mongolia During the Civil War Period
12. Ph. Ossendovsiy,  And Animals, and People, and Gods (Moscow: Piligrim, 1994).
13. V. Ochur, ‘The Great October and Tuva’ (Kyzyl, 1967).
14. ‘Resolution of the Yenisei Cossacks’ Meeting 1 held in Krasnoyarsk, on 25 May’, Siberian Village, 
1917, № 13, pp. 2-23.
15. K. Seifulin,  The History of Foreign Military Intervention and the Civil War in Tuva  (1918 – 1921) 
(Kyzyl, 1956).
16. K. Shoygu, The Black Griffon’s Feather (Kyzyl, 1998).
17. V. Shuldyakov, The Yenisei Cossacks’ Battalion Destruction. 1917 – 1920, Book I (Moscow: 
CJSC Tsentrpoligraph, 2004).
18. V. Shuldyakov, The Yenisei Cossacks’ Battalion Destruction». 1920 – 1922, Book II (Moscow: 
CJSC Tsentrpoligraph, 2004).
19. L. Yuzefovich,  The Sovereign of the Desert (Fate phenomena of Baron R. Ungern-Sternberg) 
(Moscow: Alice Luck, 1993).
